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Capitalism and the Marxist Imaginary at Yale

(and Elsewhere)

Richard Levin

This is a kind of response to Michael Sprinker’s essay
in the last issue of Journal x on the TA strike at Yale
in 1995-96, but like him I wont be concentrating on
the strike itself. Instead I want to look at some of the
more general questions raised by it and by his essay,
beginning with the relationship between capitalism
and our colleges and universities. Sprinker’s analysis
of the situation at Yale is based on an attempt to
equate colleges/universities with capitalist
and the centerpiece of this effort is a chart in which
he lists the
of people in the academic hierar
chy, from TAs to trustees, and connects them with
equal signs to
in the factory hierarchy, from
temporary workers to the board of directors
(Sprinker 210). This is the equation that enables him
to argue that graduate students are really
and
so are “exploited” by the appropriation of their “sur
plus” labor (213,
Despite
use of equal signs, however, and his
insistence that the two hierarchies are “exactly” alike
and march “to the very same tune, responding to
identical imperatives” applied “with equal force”
(210-11), the fact is that this isn’t
equation but
analogy and,
most analogies, it serves the analogist’s agenda by focusing only on similarities (real
alleged) between the two things that s/he wants to
connect and passing over their differences that weak
this connection.1 The differences become obvious
once we realize that his factory hierarchy omits two
essential groups of people — the customers who buy
the factory products and so
its income, and
the owners (shareholders) who put up the capital to
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operate the factory and reap the profits from its income, or, in Marxist parlance,
from the “surplus labor” of its workers.2 The reason they’re omitted is obvious:
when we add them to the academic hierarchy the analogy is in big trouble. The
owners are the taxpayers for public colleges and nonprofit corporations
pri
vate ones,
if we limit ourselves to undergraduate programs where virtually
all TAs work, the only customers are the students (or their parents) who buy the
product with their tuition.3 But this tuition income is always less than the cost
of the programs, and so colleges operate at a loss, which
that the own
ers, instead of reaping a profit, have to make good the loss through taxes the
endowment. This in turn means that, since no profit is made from their
no “surplus labor” in the Marxist sense is appropriated from the TAs.
It seems clear, then, that Marx’s analysis of capitalism and “surplus labor”
doesn’t apply to modern colleges or other nonprofit institutions, and there’s no
reason why it should, since Marx wasn’t dealing with them.4 There is, howev
er, another aspect of the Marxist tradition that impels believers to extend this
analysis to all aspects of society, which I’ll call the Marxist “imaginary,” using
the term loosely to draw on both Lacan’s concept of an infantile imaginary
order of illusory unity prior to our entrance into the symbolic order, and
Althusser’s concept of ideology as
imaginary
“mystified” relation to —
and hence “misrecognition” of— social reality.5
Actually, the Marxist tradition has two distinct but related imaginaries.
One is the myth of “primitive communism,”
idyllic
in the childhood
of the race when there was no individuality or conflict and people lived togeth
er in perfect unity and harmony. Not all Marxists still believe in this, although
it was recently revived in Fredric Jameson’s The Political Unconscious and Frank
Lentricchia’s call (before his conversion, of which more later) for “a redemptive
project” that will “make us whole again beyond confusion” (151).6 Nor is the
idea limited to Marxists, since many other groups have similar myths of a
utopia in the past from which we have fallen — the Garden of Eden for Jews
and Christians, the Golden Age of the pagans, the good old days of the found
ing fathers or simple small-town life for some reactionaries, and so on.7
The
and much more important Marxist imaginary is a view of the
world as a Manichean conflict between the forces of good and evil. This too
isn’t unique to Marxists; it’s shared by many other people, especially on the far
right, although their definition of the two forces is obviously very different. It’s
often connected to the first imaginary, since those who believe in a lost utopia
in the childhood of the race or nation usually believe it was lost because of some
evil entity that still operates today and must opposed by the good forces. For
those who look back to the Garden of Eden, this enemy is literally Satan, and
for those with other “edens” the enemy is typically given satanic qualities.
Reactionaries do this to secular humanism or feminism or whatever they blame
for the loss of our earlier innocence, and Marxists do it to private property, class
division, and their modern embodiment in capitalism, which destroyed primi
tive communism and so
their Satan or Evil Other (hereafter
ated EO). Stephen Greenblatt observes that Marxists see capitalism not “as a
complex historical movement” in a complex and changing world but “as a uni
tary demonic principle” (151), and this is borne out, for example, when Jim
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Neilson and Gregory Meyerson “identify capitalism as the engine behind glob
al suffering” (242), and when Sprinker-says that college officials who deal with
capitalist enterprises are “sup [ping] with the devil” (212). It’s
analogy, to be
sure, but it serves his agenda and reveals his mystification of capitalism as the
EO — the Wicked Witch of the West who, like Crabby Appleton,8 is “rotten
to the core.”
The Manicheanism of the Marxist imaginary dictates not only that capi
talism must be the EO locked in this struggle with the good (socialist) forces
opposed to it but also that every other issue must
viewed as a
between two — and only two — sides, one totally good and the other totally
evil, and that all these struggles must turn out to be the same. Sprinker makes
this explicit in his final statement that “the fundamental social conflict in our
time remains that between labor and capital” (217), or what he refers to in the
same essay as the conflict between “workers” and “bosses”
“owners” (210,
213, 215).9 He also divides all political positions into the good “progressive”
camp that fights capitalism and the bosses/owners and the evil “conservative”
camp that supports them (217). He makes a similar division between those
who oppose the trend to “corporatize” the university (anti-capitalist progres
sives) and those who support it (pro-capitalist conservatives) (211-12). He
even divides literary critics into the same two camps: the bad conservatives
who treat literature in aesthetic terms and the good progressives who treat it in
sociological terms (213-14). The Yale TA strike
another example of
this polarized division between good/progressive/workers and evil/conservative/bosses. In fact he defines this polarization twice as a choice between two
sides — “I know which side I’d rather be on” (213), and “we all have to get our
heads straight about which side we’re on” (215) — just as in an earlier essay
dealing with broader issues he insisted that “The only real question . . . is:
Which side are you on?” (“Commentary” 116).
Sprinker’s Marxist imaginary (or these aspects of it) can therefore be
summed up in a little chart, which I offer as
explanation of his chart of the
academic and factory hierarchies, replacing each equal sign with a “ ”:

Evil
capitalism
capital, bosses, owners
conservative
corporatized university
aesthetic criticism
Yale administration

vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.

Good
socialism
labor, workers
progressive
uncorporatized university
sociological criticism
YaleTAs

I call this an “imaginary” because, as in Althusser’s definition of ideology, it pre
sents those interpellated into it with a mystified
of social reality,
which doesn’t come neatly lined up into good and evil sides. It also resembles
Lacan’s imaginary since it’s a simplistic and
view of life — exemplified
folklore, fairy tales, and children’s literature and TV programs — that erases all
complexities, nuances, and
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It’s easy to show that each of Sprinker’s binaries is a mystification or mis
recognition of reality, beginning with the opposition of labor and capital that’s
supposed to underlie all the others since it’s “the fundamental social conflict in
our time.” He says that “You don’t have to be an old-fashioned marxist to rec
ognize” this (217), but in fact you do have to be a Marxist to “recognize” (that
is, misrecognize) it, because anyone else will see that the evidence against it is
overwhelming. It’s true that in capitalist societies there are always conflicts
between labor and capital, but they’re usually dealt with by a series of short
term solutions through negotiation, litigation, or legislation. In many parts of
the world, however, the most fundamental, intractable, and violent social con
flicts are between racial/ethnic or religious or regional
and while eco
nomic class plays a part in some of them, it’s usually a minor one. Indeed the
most important social conflict in our time involving labor as an entity was in
Poland, where organized workers after a long struggle (“class warfare”?) over
threw their Marxist rulers, who clearly
the “bosses” and I suppose could
be considered “capital” (“state capitalism”?), but I don’t think that’s the kind of
conflict Sprinker has in mind. The evidence shows that there’s fundamental
social conflict; there are instead many kinds of social conflicts that may be
interrelated in many ways but
’t reducible to any
kind. But this
to evidence won’t affect Marxists (who could dismiss it as “empiricist”), since
their imaginary always already knows that there must be a fundamental conflict
and what it must be.
The evidence also contradicts Sprinker’s division of political positions into
evil “conservatives” and good “
” For one thing, it fails to account
for centrists or liberals — a matter of some interest to me since I was recently
accused by a Marxist of being “a self-confessed liberal” (Drakakis, Review 406),
which I self-confess is true — and it also fails to distinguish conservatives from
reactionaries. Presumably, since the imaginary dictates that there are only two
sides, all these non-progressives must be lumped together as evil.10 But even
when we restrict ourselves to the “progressives” we’re in trouble, since we can’t
tell if this is a code word for Marxists or if it includes non-Marxist feminist,
black, and gay activitists who are also trying to bring about a better society but
aren’t trying to bring down capitalism. And we’re still in trouble even if we’re
restricted to Marxists. Is Sprinker on the same side as Stalinists or Pol-Potists
or Mas’ud Zavarzadeh, who, as we’ll see, doesn’t want to be on
side? The
evidence tells us that there are many political positions, and while they can be
arranged roughly on a continuum (although even this creates problems at each
end — how do we determine if Zavarzadeh is more or less “progessive” than
Sprinker?), they can’t be reduced to two opposing sides.
The same objections apply to the treatment of what Sprinker calls the cor
poratizing of the university — the growing trend to run universities like busi
ness corporations. Since his Marxist imaginary defines corporations (that is,
capitalism) as the EO, any attempt by the university to imitate or traffic with
them must also be evil, and so academics must line up on two polarized sides
— the good guys who
the trend and the bad guys who support it — and
these groups must in turn be equated to the polarized political sides, with the
former group as “progressive” and the latter “conservative.” But Jeffrey
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Williams demonstrates that opposition to this trend runs across the entire
political spectrum, from reactionaries who want to return to the good old days
when the university was an elitist ivory tower unsullied by capitalism, to radi
cals who want it to be
instrument for overthrowing capitalism.11 And lib
erals like me avoid blanket a priori endorsements or rejections of the trend
because we want to judge each manifestation on its merits. We certainly
oppose any “corporatizing” that interferes with the university’s educational mis
sion, but since we don’t believe that capitalism is inherently evil, we won’t
assume that every attempt to imitate a corporation by working for greater econ
omy and efficiency is necessarily a bad thing.
From this perspective some of Sprinker’s ghastly examples of the trend
don’t seem very ghastly. One such example is the decision of Oregon State
University to turn over its food services in the student union, which were run
at a loss, to a Pepsi subsidiary (211-12). The “evil” here is supposed to be selfevident, but there’s no reason why a university should in the restaurant busi
ness, and there’s good reason to believe that a company specializing in this
would, if properly monitored, provide better service to the students.12 It’s also
hard to see what’s wrong with transforming
annual loss into an annual
income that will go to the general operating fund that could
used, among
other things, to increase TA salaries.
His most amusing example comes from Tufts University where, he says,
“bribes” were “spread around” to have the registrar’s phone play an advertise
ment for Coca
a “product that . . .
dissolve nails left in it overnight”
(212). I haven’t heard that bobe-mayse (along with the one about the aphrodisi
ac effect of mixing Coke and aspirin) since my teens,13 but it explains a puzzling
remark of Malcolm Evans, another Marxist, who laments the end of Mao’s Cul
tural Revolution when “Coca-Cola advertisements . . . returned to Beijing”
(255). I wondered why
thinks that drinking a Coke is worse than being
“struggled” by Red Guards and being imprisoned or banished to a “re-educa
tion” labor camp (the fate of millions of innocent victims of this revolution), but
now I realize that
like Sprinker, sees Coke as a symbol of capitalism and so
as the EO.14 Nor is there any need to assume bribery; the company paid Tufts
for the right to advertise and the money went into the aforementioned operat
ing fund. The deal does sound rather tacky, but it’s not evil and won’t have any
harmful effect on the students’ education or their stomachs.
The attempt to extend the Marxist imaginary to literary criticism is no
more successful. Sprinker wants to divide all critics into two sides, those who
view literature as a repository of “enduring, historically unchanging value,” and
those who view it in “sociological” terms as “imbricated in . . . socio-political
relations,” and he wants to line them up with his two political sides, the bad
conservatives and good progressives (213-14). But the political line-up won’t
work. Some of the most prominent “sociological” critics today are the New
Historicists, who
’t progressive in the Marxist sense (witness Greenblatt’s
comment on Marxism quoted earlier), and the old historical critics were “soci
ological” but were often quite conservative politically. The division of the field
into two kinds of criticism won’t work either. It omits the psychological crit
ics, who don’t fit into either camp, and it omits critics like me who fit into both
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— who believe that literary works are “imbricated” in their time and place, but
that some of them have a more general appeal (not unchanging or universal)
that can transcend that time and place, which is why people are still able to
enjoy them.
The Marxist imaginary runs into the same kind of trouble when it’s applied
to the Yale TA strike. Since it can t count past two, it produces another eitherbinary in Sprinker’s essay: good progressives, who view the TAs as workers
and support them, versus bad conservatives, who view them as student-appren
tices and support the administration. But again life isn’t that simple. Some
people support the TAs but oppose their grade strike,15 while others support
the administration but
its punishment of the
There are also
other intermediate positions, and I’ll bet my next sabbatical that way out on the
far left there are ultra-progressives calling down a plague on both houses
because the TAs are merely “union reformists” who
’t trying to bring down
capitalism and so are no better than the administration.
Moreover, our attitude toward the TAs doesn’t depend on whether we
accept Sprinker’s equation of a university to a factory or the equation of it to a
medieval guild that is proposed by some administration supporters, and that he
dismisses as “the stupidities” they “spouted” (210). When I argued that the first
equation is really an analogy that focuses on similarities that serve the analogist’s agenda and passes over differences that don’t, I wasn’t suggesting that we
replace it with the second equation, which is also
analogy that serves the
same purpose. One equation/analogy is thus no more (or less) “stupid” than the
other, but we don’t have to
between them because, as Crystal Bartolovich demonstrates in her perceptive essay on the strike in the same issue of
Jx (225), the TAs are both workers and student-apprentices.16 Nor is there any
way determine which role is more fundamental or “real,” unless
is inter
pellated into the Marxist imaginary and so knows a priori that the boss vs.
worker relationship is always the fundamental reality.
There is, however, a principle (not an analogy) that doesn’t require a choice
between these two roles and that I think should determine our attitude toward
the TAs. Since I’ a “self-confessed liberal,” it won’t be surprising to learn that
this is the principle of liberal individualism, which recognizes that the TAs, in
addition to being workers and apprentices, are also informed, rational adults
and so are the best judges of their own interests — certainly better judges than
the faculty or administration, who have their own interests at stake.17 If then
they decide that it’s in their interests to form a union and strike, they should
have the right
do this (a right, I might
that they wouldn’t have under
most Marxist regimes), and liberals should support them on the basis of this
principle and of the traditional liberal alliance with organized labor that goes
back at least as
as the New Deal.
Sprinker’s Marxist imaginary isn’t even needed to judge the TA’s grievances.
To adapt his own statement, you don’t have to be a Marxist to recognize that
they’re exploited.— all you have to do is compare what they’re paid per course
with what Assistant Professors are paid. The imaginary is not only unnecessary
here but is in fact obfuscatory, for it
that the
will be exploited no
matter how much they’re paid, since under capitalism all workers are exploited
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through the extraction of their surplus labor to produce profits (although we
saw that no profits are produced by TAs). Even the CEOs (Chief Evil Others)
of our major corporations and our major sports stars, with seven-digit salaries,
are exploited, apparently, because they too "sell their labor for money” (the
Marxist definition of a
unlike
really do produce profits for
others. According to this logic, then, the only way to end the exploitation of
TAs (and CEOs and sports stars) is not by raising their wages but by over
throwing capitalism and establishing socialism, which is no help to the TAs in
their present plight. (Of course, exploited workers in advanced capitalist
es
economies,
earn much
than
byunexploited
oppose
in comparable jobs
be more nonbelievers
to in
motives in
socialist
but people trapped
isn in the Marxist imaginary cant recog
nize this reality.)
The Marxist imaginary also interferes with our perception of and response
to the trend toward the “corporatizing” of our universities. This is a very real
and very serious problem, which has troubled many liberals and even some con
servatives, as I noted, but Sprinker’s analysis only muddies the waters. For one
thing, he seems to
arguing against himself when he asserts that the univer
sity “is becoming more and more corporatized with each passing year” (211),
because he can’t explain what it was before this trend or how in that earlier peri
od it managed to escape corporatization. In other passages he argues that
under capitalism the university is necessarily a form (and servant) of corporate
enterprise, and this is confirmed his chart of equations, which is supposed to
apply to capitalist universities and factories at any time (it also applies, with a
few changes in nomenclature, to socialist universities and factories, but that’s
another story). Moreover, because his imaginary defines capitalism as the EO,
all manifestations of the trend become evil, which makes it impossible
dis
criminate among them and even leads, as we saw some of his examples (that
awful Coke), to a trivializing of the problem. It’s not likely, therefore, that this
essay will persuade any non-Marxists to
the trend, but that
not be
its purpose.
One indication that Sprinker ’t interested in persuading us is his indul
gence in a kind of name-calling, which is another effect of the Marxist imagi
nary that misrecognizes all
as the EO. People and organizations
he disapproves of are “notorious,” “infamous,” “silly,” “benighted,” and traffic in
“stupidities”; the people’s views are “spouted” rather than stated, their organiza
tions are “spawned” rather than formed, and so on. And he regularly impugns
the motives of these people: they accept “bribes,” as we saw (212), their argu
ments are “just self-serving” (210), and they are “paid lackeys” (215); Sandra
Gilbert and Frank Lentricchia are guilty of “a breathtaking gesture of bad faith”
for renouncing the progressive views of literature that they “once professed to
think”; and John Ellis decided that “attacking theory would likely bring him to
the attention of some movers and shakers” (213).
He doesn’t explain why it’s “bad faith” to change one’s mind, or whether
this also applies to changes in the other direction. If a conservative converted
to Marxism and renounced her former views, would Sprinker accuse her of “bad
faith”? And he has no access to Ellis’s motives; he doesn’t have to, since the
imaginary always already knows that the
of the EO can never be sin-
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cere and so must be venal. Its only fair, then, that his own motives should be
impugned by a fellow Marxist, Mas’ud Zavarzadeh, who thinks hes farther to
the left than Sprinker and accuses him of “cynical pragmatism” because he
serves the interests of “the Routledge-Verso cartel” (110).18
It’s hard to believe that Sprinker (or Zavarzadeh) expects to convince
by this kind of personal attack, which will turn off those who
’t already
convinced. I don’t engage in it and I don’t think I’ smarter than the people
I’ arguing against or more sincere. (Indeed my restraint may itself have an
ulterior motive — the desire to reach those who are turned off by name-call
ing.) I try to bear in mind Martin Mueller’s statement of “the simple truth that
intelligence, insight, and integrity have been found [in people] very far to one’s
political left and very far to one’s political right” (29).19 But if I were
descend to the personal level, the attitude that I’d adopt (and urge others to
adopt) toward Marxists would
not anger but
After all, it can’t
be easy to be a Marxist today. Think of all the intellectual and emotional ener
that must be expended in denying what obviously happened: that the Marx
ist imaginary has been abandoned (another “breathtaking gesture of bad faith”?)
in most of the countries where it operated, and even those countries that still
have Marxist regimes are
converting to market economies,20 so that just
about the only true believers left are now holed up, completely isolated and
completely impotent, in the academy. We can therefore expect to find in this
pitiful remnant a lot of thrashing about, including some desperate clutches at
straws (even their knowledge of children’s TV programs), personal attacks
liberals and each other, and compulsive intoning of the old discredited mantras
about “the fundamental social conflict,” as they sink slowly into the ashcan of
history.

Notes
1. Marxist rhetoric deploys a number of other “interested” analogies as if
they were equations: “wage slavery” that ’t really slavery, “class warfare” that
isn’t really war, “economic violence” that isn’t really violent, “state capitalism”
that ’t really capitalism, and “economic democracy,” “democratic centralism,”
and “Democratic People’s Republic” (see note 20) that
’t really democratic.
The first four are clearly meant to be dyslogistic and the last three eulogistic.
2. For the sake of the argument I’m using the Marxist theory of surplus
labor that Sprinker assumes, but I don’t believe it and don’t know of any rep
utable economist who does. It’s based on the
doctrine that labor and
its products have a “real” value independent of the market, and it can’t stand up
under the most obvious questions, which presumably is why Zavarzadeh won’t
let us question it — he insists that it’s “an unsurpassable objectivity” that is
“ineradicable” and “is not open to interpretation” (98).
3. Graduate programs are more complex since many of them derive part of
their income from public or private grants, but they don’t make a profit on this.
A university endowment, of course, makes profits from its investments, but not
from the operation of the university.
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4. There’s a reference in Capital to a schoolmaster producing surplus value
for his employer (644), but Marx is thinking here of a small, private elementary
or secondary school that’s owned by one man who profits from it.
5. In his introduction (11) . Kamps suggests that Althusser’s conception of
(capitalist) ideology
be applied to the Marxists’ own ideology, which is
what I’ be trying to do.
6. Compare Plato’s Symposium 189E-193D, where Aristophanes says that
humans
once round but were bisected by Zeus, so that
half now
yearns to recover its original wholeness. But that’s not presented as history.
7. I call this imaginary “Edenism” and discuss it, with more examples, in
“Bashing” 81-3. I also discuss the second or Manichean imaginary in “Polari
zation” 64-7.
8. He was the villain in Tom Terrific, and I drag him in here to counter
Sprinker’s claim that Marxists will win what he calls the “decisive battle” for
students’ minds because they know about childrens’ TV programs and their
opponents don’t (213-14).
9. He sometimes conflates “bosses” and “owners,” but in a modern corpo
ration they are separate groups of people.
10. Thus Drakakis, who calls me a “self-confessed liberal,” also calls me a
“reactionary” in another essay published in the same year (“Terminator” 64),
and Zavarzadeh relegates all those who are less “revolutionary” than he is
(including many Marxists) to the same camp because they are “complicit” with
capitalism (92, 93, 94, 99, 100, 101, and so
The slogan of the old Popu
lar Front was “No enemies to the left!” but the slogan of our new academic pro
gressives seems to be “No friends to the right!”
11. His essay is an intelligent analysis of the problem that doesn’t rely on
simplistic political binaries.
12. He objects that students now face a monopoly, but they also faced one
under the earlier arrangement. There’s a long tradition of student complaints
about the food in university-operated cafeterias and dining halls.
13. I recall conducting an empirical (not, of course, empiricist) experiment
placing some nails of different kinds and sizes in ajar filled with Coca-Cola
for a week, but they
no ill effects. I also remember taking a Coke and
an aspirin, with no beneficial effects.
14. Jameson also laments the end of the Cultural Revolution and doesn’t
mention its victims (Ideologies 2.208).
Along the same lines, I have heard Marxists bemoan the opening of a
McDonald’s in Moscow, which apparently is more horrible than Stalin’s purges,
although they didn’t claim that Big Macs dissolve iron.
15. Bérubé, who is certainly not a conservative and who strongly supports
the TA union, points out that the grade strike pit it “against the interests of
undergraduates and faculty alike, thus isolating the union politically” (40), and
Bartolovich, who also argues for the
wonders if “grade strikes are the best
possible strategy for academic unions to deploy” (230).
16. Sprinker realizes that professors “are at once cultural intellectuals ... and
also workers' (209), but this insight doesn’t extend to TAs.
17. Bérubé shows that the “Yalefaculty had no direct stake' in the unioniza
tion of the TAs (48), but they obviously thought that they did.
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18. This is another example of Marxist name-calling, since RoutledgeVerso obviously ’t a cartel. The title of his essay shows that Zavarzadeh also
regards views that he disagrees with as "stupidity.”
19. Compare Bartolovich’s conclusion that many who voted (as she did) for
the MLA resolution condemning the Yale administration and many who voted
against it acted “thoughtfully” and “carefully” (230). It’s hard to imagine such
a statement coming from an inhabitant of the Marxist imaginary.
20. The only exception is the Democratic People’s Republic of
where
the imaginary survives intact under Great Leader Kim Jong II, who was recent
ly elected General Secretary of the Workers’ Party “by the Unanimous Will and
Desire of the Korean People” (Committee A21), and who also happens to be
the eldest son of the late Great Leader Kim II Sung.
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